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  Executive summary 
 The Rudd Government has promised to tackle Australia’s water 
crisis confidently, equitably and efficiently. This report proposes that 
this commitment be extended to put in place a suite of institutional 
arrangements that can be confidently explained as ones likely to fix 
Australia’s water allocation and investment problems. 
We urge people to begin by considering the robustness of the 
institutional template set out in this report and leave negotiation of 
the percentages and amounts of money offered to facilitate adoption 
of this template to a later stage. 
 
Build on the NWI 
and NPWS 
Many of the clues derive from knowledge about the design of robust 
systems. From a water perspective, this knowledge is well 
summarised in the National Water Initiative. Some of this knowledge 
is developed further in the National Plan for Water Security. 
Moreover, the money needed to fix the water crisis is available. 
 
 One of the key elements in the proposal is the reintroduction of an 
incentive payment system that rewards State and Territory 
governments for the delivery of agreed milestones. In the case of 
water reform, past experience has shown that reform is easier if 
agreement on what needs to be done is accompanied by an 
arrangement that makes delivery financially rewarding. 
 
 The Murray-Darling Basin 
More than a 
drought 
The causes of the Murray-Darling Basin’s problems stem from a 
flawed allocation regime. Moreover, because Basin Governments 
could not agree, arrangements expressed in the new Commonwealth 
Water Act of 2007 are compromised. 
The short answer to the question: “Can the arrangements set out in 
the new Water Act be confidently presented as likely to work well in 
times when water is abundant, in drought and cope during a 
prolonged dry period?” is NO. 
 
  The Basin’s water resources, its river and aquifer environments and 
its people all deserve a regime that can be expected to work well in 
long dry periods and in times when water is abundant. The system 




Two commitments To fix the Basin’s problems, it is necessary to put a new system in 
place that is designed to cope with whatever climatic conditions the 
future brings. Now is the time to: 
1. Replace the current entitlement and allocation regime with a 
robust one that can be confidently explained as one that will 
work – work no matter what climatic future arrives. 
2. Implement the resultant change in a just and fair manner. 
 
Benefits The main benefit of the proposal is a confident change to a system 
that can be expected to work – no matter what the future brings. For 
irrigators, the proposal also brings benefits in terms of prevention of 
the ongoing erosion of entitlement reliability and an end to 
investment and planning uncertainty. For the environment, it means 
a timely end to the debate about how best to resolve existing over-
allocation problems. Other wider benefits include 
 
− An efficient water trading market that reflects the value of future 
opportunities; 
− An efficient adjustment process that establishes a ‘level playing 
field’ among all supply systems and all irrigation businesses;  
− A reduction in opportunities for speculation and opportunism; and 
− The immediate transfer of money to local communities in a way 
that will enable all to make the necessary adjustments in an 
efficient and socially equitable manner. 
 
A dramatic increase in the efficiency of environmental water use and 
storage management can also be expected. 
 
A new Agreement This report proposes that the Federal Government, in partnership 
with Murray-Darling States and the ACT enter into a new Murray-
Darling Basin Agreement that commits all to working under a system 
that is capable of coping with whatever future arrives. It is proposed 
that money to expedite the change process is made available now in 
a way that empowers and speeds, rather than hinders, progress. 
One of the important principles of just reform is that the direction, 
nature and extent of the reform process must be clear. The new 
Murray-Darling Basin Agreement needs to bring clarity to water 
allocation and sharing arrangements. 
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Start with the 
southern system 
The Murray-Darling Basin can be usefully partitioned into a northern 
summer-rainfall dominated system and a southern winter rainfall 
dominated system. While management in the northern Darling 
System needs attention, as a result of the pattern of climatic events 
and water allocation decisions over the last two decades, the 




shared and flood 
water 
The report proposes that the new Agreement begins by defining 
entitlements and allocation rules in a manner that is consistent with 
the way water can be captured, stored and allowed to flow through 
and across land. This will require it to: 
1. identify first the water needed to maintain the basic character 
of the system by putting aside enough water to cover 
evaporative losses, keep the Murray Mouth open, periodically 
flush some salt to the sea and provide sufficient amounts for 
existing stock and domestic purposes => maintenance 
water; 
2. recognise that flood waters, particularly that water which can 
not be held in storages and is difficult to control, is best left to 
flow through the system in a way that minimises damage to 
property whilst maximising benefit to the environment => 
flood water; and 
3. then formally share the remaining water between the 
environment and all other water users => shared water. 
Rather than using complex planning systems to define when and 
how much water should be given to the environment, this report 
proposes that the environment be given a formal entitlement to a 
proportion of all allocations of water to the shared water pool. 
Consistent with the National Water Initiative, there would be no 
difference between an entitlement held by the environment and that 





systems as one  
The entire system, surface and groundwater, must be managed as a 
single interconnected system. For too long, the positive contribution 
that ground water flows make to the river and the adverse effects on 
river flow from land-use changes, like increased forestry, more farm 
dams and increases in saline water interception – have not been 
properly accounted for. If efficient investment decisions are to be 
made, if communities are to prosper and the environment’s interest 
is not going to be continuously eroded, the practice of granting two or 
more people the opportunity to take the same water in the same year 




Establish a Basin 
water entitlement 
register 
The existing suite of allocation rules and the Cap on water diversions 
can be replaced with a Basin water entitlement register that defines 
bulk entitlements to receive allocations to the southern River Murray 





responsible for the 
integrity of the 
Basin entitlement 
register 
A Murray-Darling Basin Authority needs to be appointed and made 
responsible for, amongst other things, making allocations across the 
system and to bulk entitlements, requiring the effects of adverse 
land-use change and other interception activities to be offset, and 
maintaining and enforcing the integrity of the Basin entitlement 
register. Penalties for using water without an allocation would apply 





To bring integrity back into the system, a take over of the entire 
system is not necessary. Land-use control remains in the hands of 
States and the ACT and, as is the current case, responsibility for 
water delivery is left in the hands of government-owned and irrigator-
owned water supply businesses. 
 
No special 
treatment for the 
environment 
The environment’s entitlement to shared water would be defined in 
exactly the same way as all other shared water entitlements. In order 
to allow local catchment boards and communities to plan with 
confidence, the majority of these environment entitlements would be 
held by regional environment trusts. 
In order to allow the environment to pay its way, the amount of 
shared water entitlement allocated to environment trusts should be 
large enough to enable them to recover costs by periodically selling 
water allocations. It should be possible to make tax deductible 
donations to these trusts and for them to enter into counter-cyclic 
trading agreements. 
State and ACT Ministers would be responsible for appointing 
trustees who, by definition, would be the guardians of that water. In 
order to allow the pursuit of system-wide initiatives, a proportion of 




Under the current regime, it is possible for an interstate entitlement 
trade to take months to complete. The new system needs trading 
rules and processes that enable electronic trading across State 
boundaries so that allocation trades can be completed 
instantaneously and all unencumbered entitlement trades completed 
within two days. 
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Carry forward 
allowed 
Each State, the ACT and all bulk water entitlement holders would be 
free to use, trade, or with an adjustment for evaporative and seepage 
losses, carry forward and store any water allocation made to them. 
 
Fix the system 
properly, fix it now 
Beginning in the southern River Murray System, it is proposed that 
as soon as a new Agreement can be put in place and approved by 
the Parliaments of all participating Governments, existing entitlement 
holders can be informed of the nature of the changes to the bulk 
entitlement system and when the change will be made. 
In order to prevent flood damage, water-users would need to 
understand that the system manager may decide to spill stored water 
when a storage is more than, say, 85 per cent full. When spilt, 
shared water would be redefined as floodwater and managed by the 
Authority as it flows through the system. 
 
The $10 billion over 
10 years or $5 
billion now? 
Under the National Plan for Water Security it was proposed that $10 
billion be invested in the Basin over 10 years. When discounted at a 
rate that recognises inflation and the opportunity cost of money 
(10%), the present value of the money on offer to the irrigation 
industry to secure water for the environment and for system 
modernisation is just over $5 billion. It is proposed that money to 
expedite the change process in the southern River Murray System is 





When property rights are changed quickly, compensation is justified 
– especially when delivered fairly and in a manner that facilitates and 
expedites the adjustment processes. To treat irrigators fairly, it is 
necessary to provide them with early financial recompense for the 
likely impact of the change, and do so in a way that enables them to 
plan for change. 
At a time when little water is available and all are searching for more 
efficient ways to use water, as soon as the new Agreement can be 
ratified by State and the ACT Parliaments, an up front compensating 












It is suggested that $500 million be set aside for the northern Darling 
System. For the southern River Murray System, $1 billion could be 
set aside in an inflation proofed fund for the reconfiguration of any 
supply systems which become redundant as a result of these 
reforms. The remaining $3.5 billion of $5 billion should be made 
available as quickly as possible. 
Given budget realities, 50% could be transferred as soon as the new 
Agreement is adopted, with two further equal 25% payments at the 
start of each of the next two financial years. If reinvested, these 
payments should not be subject to capital gains tax. 
If States and the ACT can agree to this proposition quickly, the first 
payment could be made in the 2008/09 financial year. In order to 
expedite the adjustment process, during the two following years, all 
government water trading charges could be waived. In addition, it 
would be possible to reimburse water supply companies for the loss 
in revenue caused by the transfer of water from their system to the 
environment. 
Under the new regime, the environment would be given a share and 
its trustees required to manage it in an efficient and accountable 
manner. 
How fast a 
change? 
Rather than a complete step change, there is an option to phase in 
the change in the balance between consumptive use and the 
environment over several years. But time, especially in the southern 
River Murray system, is not on the Basin’s side. The slow 
incremental reform processes that have characterised the last 
decade of water reform have not served the Basin well. In our view, 
provided that adequate financial recompense and sufficient warning 
is given, the proposed step change is preferable to avoid the 
uncertainty of a long drawn out adjustment process. 
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Review system size 
and configuration 
Finally, at the time of writing this report, the southern River Murray 
System is virtually out of water. Many wetlands have already been 
closed, and the level of Lake Alexandrina and Lake Albert is now 
below sea level. If this coming winter does not deliver well above 
average rainfall, a review of system size and configuration, and, in 
particular, a decision as to how best to downsize the entire system 
should be undertaken. 
It may not be possible to keep all environmental assets and all 
irrigation systems going. Parts may have to be abandoned, or 




In summary, it is time to reset the system now. The biggest mistake 
this nation could make is to expend $10 billion and take 10 years to 
only partially fix the Murray-Darling Basin’s problems. 
A new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement is needed. This new 
Agreement must be more than a general plan. It must be a co-
operative inter-state Agreement that rises above politics, and its 
implementation and management must not be subject to the whims 
of ministers or other authorities. It is time to stop incremental 
approaches to water reform and return to a focus on getting the 
fundamentals right. 
Now is the time to confidently inform those who depend upon, and 
love the Murray-Darling Basin, what type of future they, and the 
system, can expect. 
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A future-proofed Basin:  
A new water management regime 
for the Murray-Darling Basin 
 “A Rudd Labor government will tackle the water crisis with a 
national plan to invest in water infrastructure, sustain our farmers, 
revitalize our rivers and water ways, secure water supplies and 
adapt to climate change”. 
ALP Policy Document, November 2007 
The first and arguably most important test of the new Rudd Government’s 
capacity to fix the national water crisis will come in the Murray-Darling 
Basin and more particularly, in the southern half of the Basin. This region 
is often described as the River Murray System, where the river system, its 
aquifers, its environment and the livelihoods of people who depend upon it 
are under threat. 
National water reform has been part of federal Labor’s agenda since the 
late 1980s. Working collaboratively with states, its first major contribution 
was the development of the current Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, 
which all participating governments agreed to in 1993. This was followed 
by the inclusion of the water-reform agenda in CoAG’s 1994 National 
Competition Policy. One of the pioneering features of this National 
Competition Policy was a condition that state and territory government 
access to competition payments would be limited to those who delivered 
the agreed reforms, including a number of critically important water 
reforms, on schedule. 
The Rudd Government’s election statement on water acknowledges the 
problems are due to much more than the current drought. Reforms over 
the past decade have been incremental, uneven and too slow. 
The National Water Initiative, agreed to at CoAG in 2004, provided a great 
platform for change because it committed governments to: 
− identifying and restoring over-allocated water systems to 
sustainable levels; 
− expanding water trading; 
− releasing environmental flows for rivers; 
− ensuring secure water access entitlements; 
− improving reporting and accounting of water use; 
− introducing transparent water planning; 
− improving the management of water in urban environments; and 
− full cost pricing in a way that reflects environmental costs. 
The National Water Initiative is acclaimed as a uniquely clear statement of 
international best practice in water management. When the NWI was 
negotiated, it was decided that it was no longer necessary to make 
delivery of agreed milestones a necessary condition for states to receive 
competition payments. 
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Unfortunately, without the financial discipline imposed by competition 
payments on state and territory governments, water reform progress has 
slowed to a snail like pace and, to make matters worse, many of the old ad 
hoc water policy and administration habits have started to return. 
The Murray-Darling Basin  
While progress has been made in the Murray-Darling Basin, many 
National Water Initiative commitments have yet to be met. 
While all participating governments agree that the current water allocation 
regime needs to be changed, lack of cooperation and fundamental flaws in 
the existing Murray-Darling Basin Agreement have hampered progress. 
Because we have glued a water-trading system onto an allocation regime 
that was never designed for the world we now find ourselves in, the 
system is going backwards faster than reforms are taking it forward. 
As many are aware, the southern part of this system is now seriously over-
allocated. Moreover, as a result of the shift to a long dry period, like 
several of those experienced in the first half of last century (Figure 1), the 
lower part of this system is now being run below empty. This is not 
sustainable. 
 
Figure 1 A century of knowledge about the Murray Darling System - total 
annual inflows. Extended droughts shown in red. 
We are living in the 21st century and it is time to reshape, time to future 
proof the system by decoupling it from the past – decoupling it from all the 
arrangements that cause problems. 
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To fix the Basin’s problems, it is necessary to put a new system in place 
that is designed to cope with whatever climatic conditions the future 
brings. Now is the time to: 
1. Replace the current entitlement and allocation regime with a robust 
one that can be confidently explained as one that will work – work 
no matter what climatic future arrives. 
2. Implement the resultant change in a just and fair manner. 
A new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 
The proposition put forward in this report is that the Federal Government, 
in partnership with Murray-Darling State governments and the ACT 
government put in place arrangements that will withstand the test of time – 
no matter what climatic future arrives. This will require a new Murray-
Darling Basin Agreement. 
The southern River Murray System is heavily dependent on winter rainfall 
and storage, while much of the northern part of the system relies on 
episodic summer rainfall and the ‘harvesting’ of water by irrigators as it 
flows past their properties. 
The good news is that the need for reform is less urgent in the summer 
rainfall driven northern Darling System. Rather than trying to fix the entire 
system in one hit, reform implementation can start in the southern River 
Murray System that encompasses the Murrumbidgee, River Murray, the 
Lower Darling and main Victorian tributaries to the River Murray.1 
Significantly, the proposition can be implemented co-operatively with the 
States. It does not require a federal take-over of the entire allocation 
system. However, it will require a resetting of the system in a way that is 
just and fair and empowers local communities. The new Agreement will 
need to: 
 
− Introduce a new bulk water sharing regime for the southern system; 
− Manage the connected ground and surface water system as one;  
− Remove water accounting flaws from the system; 
− Create a water right for the environment; 
− Establish environment trusts; 
− Decide how hard to work the River; 
− Replace the Cap with bulk entitlement shares; 
− Appoint an Authority to allocate water to all bulk entitlement holders; 
− Establish a Basin entitlement register; 
− Create consistency among states in entitlements; 
− Provide guaranteed allocations; 
− Retain key State responsibilities; 
− Empower the water market; 
− Ensure a fair and equitable transition; 
                                            
1
  If New South Wales and Victoria agree this could include the Lachlan and 
Wimmera systems. 
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− Improve water trading processes, and 
− Allow water allocations to be carried forward. 
If the Commonwealth, participating States and the ACT are prepared to 
sign-off on these core features, then we will have the opportunity to break 
the current impasse, get the details right and launch a new era in the 
management of the Murray-Darling Basin and its people. 
In the southern River Murray System, the main difference between this 
proposal and that proposed under the Water Act 2007 is the upfront 
commitment to giving bulk entitlement shares to each State and the ACT 
and the environment, to bring an end to all processes that are undermining 
entitlement reliability, and to commence an adjustment process that is 
more predictable because the nature of the final outcome is 
predetermined. 
The proposal also raises the question as to whether or not it will be 
possible to retain all environmental assets. Parts of the system may have 
to be abandoned, and we may have to accept that some parts have 
changed forever. 
The following provides more detail supporting the listed elements of the 
proposed new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement. 
* 
A new bulk water sharing regime for the southern River Murray 
System 
One of the essential building blocks for the proposed new agreement is a 
new water bulk water sharing regime for the southern River Murray 
System. 
If the system is to be robust enough to work no matter what climatic 
conditions the future brings, the allocation regime must be aligned with 
hydrological realities and defined in a way compatible with processes such 
as evaporation, storage and flow across and through land. 
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The southern River Murray System is characterised by a set of linked and 
interdependent dams, weirs, locks, lakes and barrages that collectively 
cause much water to evaporate. 
Thus, the first step to a robust regime is to differentiate between water 
needed to cover evaporative losses and keep the Murray Mouth open; 
flood water; and water that can be shared between the environment and 
irrigation and other consumptive water users. The new Agreement needs 
to: 
• Set aside enough maintenance water to allow for evaporative and 
other losses, existing stock and domestic uses2 and to flush a small 
amount into the sea.3 
• Leave floodwater, when it arrives, to be managed in a way that 
maximises environmental benefit whilst minimising damage to 
property. 
• Define the remaining water as shared water and put in place a 
regime that entitles all users and the environment to a share of any 
allocations made to this pool of water. 
Some may prefer to think of the maintenance water as a base flow but it is 
more than this. Without this minimal amount of water in the system, no-
one can access water. Without it, there is no system as we know it. 
Pragmatically, and as this water will always be taken, maintenance water 
needs to include a provision for existing stock and domestic water. 
At the end of this report, we also raise the question of whether or not the 
system should be reconfigured in a way that reduces the volume of water 
needed to maintain the system. 
The maximum size of the shared water system is defined primarily by the 
volumetric capacity of the existing storage system. In most parts of the 
system, it would also be necessary to assign delivery entitlements to 
manage congestion through the Barmah Choke and within some water 
supply systems and, as already happens in the continuous accounting 
systems used in Queensland, make efficient trade of delivery entitlements 
possible (Figure 2). 
                                            
2
  The emphasis here is on existing stock and domestic uses which in most cases 
are unmetered. As far as possible, these uses should be metered.  
3
  Scientists analyzing this part of the system think that the absolute minimum 
necessary is around 200 GL.  
Total evaporative losses from the southern River Murray System are in the vicinity of 
1,800 GL per year. We imagine that something like the first 2000 GL of annual inflows 
would be defined as maintenance water. 
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Figure 2 Basic structure of the proposed regime 
Manage connected ground and surface water systems as one 
In addition, the new Agreement needs to recognise the high degree of 
connectivity among the Basin’s unconfined aquifers and its rivers. 
Whenever more groundwater is used, less water ultimately enters the 
river. The new Agreement thus needs to: 
• Define all groundwater as part of the system and use a 
similar sharing system to allocate entitlements to take water 
from it. 
As part of the process of managing system interconnectivity, it will be 
necessary to define the proportion and volume of groundwater in each part 
of the system that transfers to other water bodies. 
* 
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Remove water accounting flaws from the system 
We cannot go on ignoring the fact that the current water accounting and 
allocation processes are undermining progress at a faster rate than water 
reform is driving the health of the southern River Murray System forward. 
It is time to get the basics of water allocation and accounting right. In 
particular, we need to stop the practice of defining water and land-use 
opportunities in a manner that allows the same water to be taken by two or 
more different people in two different locations. Whenever this happens, 
either someone else or the environment loses. 
Too many actions that reduce flow and debase entitlement reliability are 
still allowed to occur. The list is long and includes the expansion of forestry 
in high rainfall areas, the continued construction of small farm dams and 
also the increased interception and evaporation of saline groundwater. 
Whenever any of these activities occur, either allocations to the water 
users or allocations to the environment are reduced. 
Flawed allocation practices, like those described above, undermine the 
integrity of the entire system and debase the value of entitlements. It is 
time to fix them. Allocation policies must not allow the actions of one party 
to undermine the interests of another. 
In short, the new Agreement must put in place an entitlement and 
allocation regime that is consistent with the way that water flows across 
the land. It is time to: 
• Require the offset of the adverse effects on supply reliability 
of all water interception activities such as forestry in high 
rainfall areas, the building of more farm dams and the 
construction of salinity interception schemes. 
Coordinated by the Authority, the States and the ACT would be required to 
establish and manage offset arrangements. Such arrangements could be 
administered by government agencies, catchment boards, or local 
governments. 
This new approach, designed to prevent land use changes from 
undermining the reliability of the entitlements held by irrigators and the 




Create a water right for the environment 
As proposed in the National Water Initiative, we need a revolution in 
environmental management that gives environmental water the same 
degree of security given to all other water-users. We need managers 
responsible and accountable for managing environmental water in the best 
interests of the environment. 
One of the features of the proposed new entitlement regime is that the 
environment is given an entitlement to receive allocations in exactly the 
same way as all other entitlement holders do. Thus: 
• In every part of the system, the environment must be given a 
formal entitlement to a proportion of all allocations to shared 
water. 
* 
Establish environment trusts 
Some environmental water needs to be held centrally, but most of the 
environment’s entitlement can be placed under the control of local or 
regional environment trusts. These environment trusts should be 
independent of ministers and other agencies, and should work in 
partnership with catchment boards and local communities to ensure that 
the water under their control is used to deliver the best environmental 
outcomes possible. 
• The majority of shared water entitlements assigned to the 
environment should be placed in regional environmental 
trusts and a small proportion held centrally in a system wide 
trust. 
Pragmatically, we suggest that the boundary of a regional environment 
trust’s responsibilities should align with catchment board boundaries, and 
include responsibility for the management of all icon environmental sites 
within their boundaries. 
By placing this water in regional trusts, environmental managers will, for 
the first time, be able to decide when, and how, to apply water to land. 
Empowered in this way, a dramatic improvement in the efficiency of 
environmental water use can be expected. Local environmental managers 
will be able to plan confidently and respond quickly when opportunities 
arise. 
The role of governments is to define environmental objectives and to 
appoint the people to be responsible for determining where, and when, the 
environment’s water should be used. At the local level, environmental 
managers, like irrigators, need to be empowered to make decisions in a 
timely manner. Therefore the new Agreement should: 
• Assign responsibility for appointing environmental trustees 
and defining the regional trusts’ objectives to the States and 
the ACT. 
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With responsibility and accountability, the environment must be seen as an 
equal partner in the system. Amongst other things, this means that 
environmental trusts must be required to pay their way, and should be 
expected to be as innovative as we expect irrigators to be. 
One of the simplest ways of enabling the environment trusts to pay their 
way is to assign enough water to each trust to enable its managers to sell 
sufficient water allocations on the water market to recover costs. Thus, 
when deciding how large to make the environment’s entitlement as a 
proportion of the shared pool: 
• The amount of shared water entitlement allocated to 
environment trusts should be large enough to enable them to 
recover costs by periodically selling water allocations. 
Under this proposal, each environment trust would be eligible under 
the Income Tax Assessment Act to receive tax deductible donations 
of water entitlement shares and/or allocations. 
Each regional environment trust should also be able to enter into 
counter-cyclic trading4 and long-term water sharing agreements with 
other entitlement holders. 
* 
Decide how hard to work the River 
Perhaps the most difficult element of this proposal is to determine the 
volume of maintenance water to set aside, and then to determine initial 
proportions of shared water to allocate as shares to each State and the 
ACT and to the environment. 
With regard to the mix between the environment and consumptive users, 
we could begin by asking: “How hard should the River Murray be worked?” 
International standards for very hard working rivers (like the southern River 
Murray system) suggest that no more than 50% of all inflows on average 
should be used for consumption. 
Assuming a continuing community preference for working this River and its 
associated aquifers very hard, and given that system maintenance water is 
first set aside and that all floods go to the River and its water dependent 
ecosystems, an indicative proportion of shared water to assign to the 
environment could be in the vicinity of 20%. 
Many will argue that 20% or, perhaps 25%, is either too much or too little 
to assign to the environment. If this proposition is accepted in principle, the 
final proportion should be determined only after careful scientific analysis 
and widespread community consultation. 
                                            
4
  Environmental and other user needs can be counter-cyclic to one another. 
Environmental managers, for example, can be very interested in turning a high river -flow 
event into a managed flood and may be prepared to contract with other entitlement 
holders to have access to more water during such times on the condition that the other 
entitlement holders have access to a larger volume during dryer times. 
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Ultimately, any decision about how healthy the River Murray and its 
tributaries should be, and what proportion of shared water is required, is a 
matter of judgement. Scientists can have their say but, at some point in 
time, participating governments will need to collectively decide on a 
proportion to allocate to the environment, and accept the consequences of 
and challenges that come with that decision. 
Once a proportion is decided upon at a system level, further analysis will 
be necessary to assign environmental entitlements to regional 
environment trusts. 
* 
Replace the Cap with bulk entitlement shares 
The Basin’s current limit on water-diversions – a cap on the use of surface 
water and the associated water-allocation rules – is incapable of dealing 
with the situation we are now facing. The current agreement was designed 
for a specific climate with higher rainfall. Now that patterns have shifted, 
the move from a fully to an over-allocated system has been inevitable and 
swift. The new agreement for the southern River Murray System should: 
• Replace the existing cap and limit on water extractions and 
associated sharing rules with a bulk entitlement system that is 
enforceable and underpinned by an accounting system that has 
integrity. 
One of the flaws in the current allocation system is that it was not designed 
to work during long dry periods such as that which occurred when 
Australia was federated and the dry period that started in 1938 and ended 
twelve years later in 1950. Critically, by drawing a clear distinction 
between maintenance water, shared water and flood water, it is possible to 
put in place a regime that can be expected to work in wet and prolonged 
dry periods. 
In the southern River Murray System and in most groundwater systems, 
the entitlement would be to a share of allocations made.5 Allocations would 
be volumetric. Shares would be unitised in the same way that company 
shares are defined. 
In most parts of the system, it would also be necessary to assign delivery 
entitlements and, as already happens in the continuous accounting 
systems used in Queensland, make efficient trade of delivery entitlements 
possible. 
                                            
5
  In episodic systems, especially those that are dry for part of the year, sharing 
rules need to be more complex and constrained by river height, etc. 
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One of the merits of assigning water entitlements as shares is that the 
entitlement system does not have to be changed if, and when, climate 
change occurs. If it gets drier, then allocations per share are reduced 
proportionately. All shareholders are expected to manage with the water 
assigned to them. All shareholders have the capacity to manage supply 
risk by carrying forward water and, within delivery limits, decide when to 
use water. 
* 
Establish a Basin water entitlement register  
An indicative template for the structure of the proposed bulk entitlement 
register to be set up in each part of the system is set up in Figure 3 below. 
Under the new Agreement, no State or Territory and no individual should 
be allowed to cheat. Practices such as those that have allowed some 
States to exceed the Cap should not be allowed to continue. 
The penalty for taking water without an allocation should be the same for a 
State or Territory, an irrigator, an environmental manager and any one 
else. At a Basin level, the penalty for taking water without an allocation 
should be something like five to ten times the market value of the water 
taken. Among other things, this requires: 
• The establishment of a Basin water entitlement register that 
defines bulk entitlements to receive allocations, and 
assignment of complete responsibility for allocating water to 
an independent, expertise-based Authority. 
• The introduction and enforcement of penalties for taking 
unallocated water. These must apply equally to the States, 
the ACT, irrigation companies, entities responsible for 
managing environmental water and all other parties. 
One of the features of the proposed Basin water entitlement register is that 
it would be possible for any person or any State or Territory to convert 




Figure 3 Indicative template for the proposed allocation regime in each part 
of the southern River Murray system. Each State share could be 
further divided into high and low security entitlements (Not to scale) 
Existing hydrological models could be used to define the boundaries of 
each part of the system. There is also a question as to whether or not the 
Snowy system should be included within the new regime or treated as an 
external source of water that becomes available for allocation whenever it 
arrives. 
* 
Appoint a new Authority to allocate water to all bulk entitlement 
holders 
The Rudd Government has committed to taking the politics out of the 
water business, and also endorsed the thrust of the National Water 
Initiative and the $10 billion National Plan for Water Security. This last 
decision includes support for an independent, expertise-based Murray-
Darling Basin Authority. Allocation decisions should be made using the 
best available science, information and expertise. The new Agreement 
must therefore: 
• Establish an independent, expertise-based Authority 
responsible for allocating groundwater and surface water, 
informed by the best available science. 
Rather than a Cap on diversions, we need a regime that requires a limit on 
allocations to the shared water pool. 
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Under the new regime, it is critical that water markets should operate in a 
fair manner that gives all participants an equally informed opportunity to be 
active in the market. In particular, allocation announcements should 
always be made in the same way. Like the Reserve Bank, the Authority 
should be required to communicate with great discipline and always be 
mindful of the weight given to its statements. The new Authority must be 
required to: 
• Give all stakeholders an equal opportunity to access 
information about likely and actual allocation 
announcements. 
* 
Create consistency among States and ACT bulk entitlements 
Entitlements throughout the system should be defined in the same 
manner. For example, the existing annual entitlement to minimum flows 
into South Australia would be replaced with a bulk water entitlement to its 
share of the system. South Australia would then be able to allocate this 
water to all users including irrigators and those in its urban centres. The 
Basin Authority and environment trusts would be responsible for 
maintaining essential river functions, and the environmental trusts would 
be further responsible for looking after the environment’s interests. As a 
result, the status of South Australian water-users would be no different 
from that of any other water-user in the system. 
As part of the process of sorting out the detail, States/Territory can be 
expected to want to split the shared water pool into high and low security 
entitlement water. If this is done, in order to climate-change-proof the 
relationship between high and low security water, it will be necessary to 
keep a degree of balance between them. One way of doing this would be 
to define the maximum size of the volume of high security water as an 
entitlement to a percentage of the moving average of the last, say, ten 
years’ allocations to the shared water pool. 
Using a similar moving average allocation rule, the States and the ACT 
may wish to create an extremely secure pool to provide for essential 
urban, industrial, mining and other needs. If agreed, this could be included 
in the bulk entitlement regime.6 
The models that underpin the CSIRO Sustainable Yield study could be 
used to help determine ground-surface water system transfer obligations 
and the most appropriate number of shares to issue in each groundwater 
system. 
* 
                                            
6
  Each State and the ACT would also be able to provide for such an arrangement 
as part of their own system. It would also be possible to include such a provision in the 
maintenance water pool. 
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Provide guaranteed allocations 
Allocations made by the Authority to bulk water entitlements should be 
conservative. Unless a calamitous event occurs, such as the failure of a 
dam, all allocations should be guaranteed as being available for delivery. 
* 
Retain key State responsibilities 
It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the proposed Authority to control 
everything. Under the proposed regime and nested under the bulk 
entitlement register, the States and the ACT would still be able to retain 
their existing register and entitlement systems. 
Furthermore, over the last decade, one of the important reforms delivered 
by the States has been the separation of water licences into formal access 
entitlements and approvals for water use at specific locations. Allocations 
are now made in proportion to each entitlement and can be traded without 
touching the entitlement.7 As a result of these reforms and through the use 
of normal development and catchment management processes, land-use 
can be controlled separately from water. Thus, under the new Agreement: 
• Responsibility for control of land-use and water-use practices 
should remain with States and the ACT on the understanding 
that they deliver agreed salinity and other water-quality 
management targets, and manage offset arrangements for 
the adverse effects of water interception activities. 
The proposed new Agreement should enable individuals and/or any 
consortia to earn and trade salinity credits. 
Similarly, as a result of a decade of water reform, state-owned and 
irrigator-owned water supply businesses now deliver water allocated to 
water users. The new system could continue to: 
• Use business structures to run and maintain system 
infrastructure and recover the costs of doing this from water 
users. 
* 
                                            
7
  Under the old regime, an allocation trade was called a temporary trade because it 
was implemented by temporarily transferring the entire entitlement to another person, 
removing the allocation from the entitlement and then transferring the entitlement back to 
the original owner. 
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Empower the water market 
Buying water for the environment is one of the most effective ways to 
restore over-allocated systems to sustainability. However, under the 
National Plan for Water Security, buying water for the environment to 
achieve the volume proposed threatens the viability of the entire water 
market. In effect, this would result in the gradual buy back of water for the 
environment over each of the next 10 years at an annual rate that, in all 
but this financial year, is greater than the value of all the water 
entitlements that have ever been sold in a year (see Figure 4).8 
 
Figure 4 National Plan for Water Security budget for modernisation and the 
purchase of environmental water as presented in budget papers for 
2007/08 
The result would be an increase in water prices to the extent that no 
irrigator would be able to compete with the environment’s water purchaser. 
The entitlement market would be wrecked and any structural adjustment 
that required the purchase of a water entitlement financially impossible. 
This proposal presented here removes the need for the government to 
directly enter the water market and buy water entitlements for the 
environment. Instead, the environment is given an entitlement to receive 
allocations in exactly the same way as all other entitlement holders do, 
with compensation paid for this change in regime. The approach allows 
the water market to continue to do what it does best – to continuously 
reveal and recalculate the value of future opportunities to use water. 
                                            
8
  Estimates of the maximum value of permanent entitlement trades in the Southern 
Connected River Murray System, suggest that the maximum total value of water 
entitlements sold separately from an accompanying land transaction is in the vicinity of 
$100 million per year. 
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Under this proposal, the water market would continue to operate. Market 
prices would be determined by buyers without government interference. If 
the alternative market purchase approach is taken, no one other than the 
government will be able to afford to buy water. For the next decade, all 
others would be forced to stand still and watch opportunity after 
opportunity go past as the government tries to fix up a past mistake. 
* 
Ensure a fair and equitable transition 
In announcing the step change to a new robust regime that is designed to 
work in all circumstances and conditions, it is necessary to treat those 
dependent upon the system fairly and equitably. This will require the 
Federal Government to: 
• Compensate entitlement holders and water supply 
companies for the impact of the change on their livelihoods 
and on the value of capital assets, and assist them to adjust 
rapidly to the new regime. 
The Howard Government’s National Plan for Water Security put aside $10 
billion, with $8.9 billion to be spent on modernising irrigation and 
purchasing water for the environment. Under this Plan, it is proposed that 
this money be spent over the next 10 years, with most not becoming 
available until after 2010. 
Discounted at 10% to allow for the time delay of expenditure over the 10 
year period and for inflation, the present value of the total of $8.9 billion on 
offer to the irrigation industry is a little over $5 billion. 
It is suggested that the northern Darling System should have access to a 
fair share of the funds set aside under the National Plan for Water 
Security. For the purposes of discussion, we suggest that an appropriate 
amount to set aside for the Darling System would be in the vicinity of $500 
million or thereabouts. This would leave around $4.5 billion for use in the 
southern River Murray System. 
$1 billion could be set aside in an inflation-proof fund for the efficient 
reconfiguration of any parts of water supply systems that become 
redundant as a result of adjustment to the new management regime. The 
remaining $3.5 billion could be used to provide financial recompense to 
the industry for the change in the way that State entitlements are defined, 
the redefinition of the environment’s entitlement, the change in the value of 
the industry’s capital assets, and for the social impacts on each person’s 
livelihood.  
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How this $3.5 billion is partitioned between irrigators and water system 
managers is a matter that requires careful consideration and further 
analysis. One option would be to provide a payment to each irrigation 
company equivalent to the termination fee these companies would be 
entitled to recover as a result of the increase in the environment’s share 
and the transfer of this water out of their supply system.9 
In order to ensure that all have sufficient opportunity to plan for the 
proposed step change, payments should be made several years in 
advance of the proposed change to the bulk water entitlement regime. 
Providing sufficient time and money is made available, all irrigators and all 
water supply companies involved would then plan for and put in place 
strategies to enable them to adjust. Pragmatically, payments to each 
irrigator could be in proportion to the current market value of their 
entitlements. 
In our view, this approach is likely to be much more cost-effective and fair 
than one that requires entitlement holders and water supply companies to 
develop modernisation proposals and apply for money to implement them. 
In particular, it would ensure that those who have already modernised their 
farms and their supply systems are not dis-advantaged. Consistent with 
National Water Initiative compensation and pricing principles, a level 
“adjustment playing field” would be put in place. 
When assessing whether or not the proposed transitionary arrangement is 
fair and just, consideration needs to be given to the value of preventing the 
ongoing erosion of entitlement reliability.  Consideration also needs to be 
given to the value of the planning and investment certainty provided by the 
assignment of formal share of shared water to the environment. Other 
wider benefits of the proposed step change include: 
 
− An efficient water trading market that reflects the value of future 
opportunities; 
− An efficient adjustment process that establishes a ‘level playing field’ 
among all supply systems and all irrigation businesses;  
− A reduction in opportunities for speculation and opportunism; and 
− The immediate injection of money into local communities to facilitate 
adjustment in an efficient and socially equitable manner. 
* 
Implementation 
As soon as a new Agreement has been approved by all Murray-Darling 
State Parliaments and the ACT Parliament, payments could be made to all 
likely to be affected by the proposed new system. 
                                            
9
  The most recent ABS survey data suggests that there 15,496 agricultural 
establishments involved in irrigation in the Murray-Darling Basin and 12,478 agricultural 
establishments involved in irrigation in the southern Murray System (see ABS 
Publication 4618.0). 
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If fiscally possible, the cheques could be for the full amount to be paid. 
Alternatively, the first payment could be for, say, 50% of the total amount 
to be paid and accompanied by a statement indicating how much more 
money would be sent at the start of the next fiscal year and, if absolutely 
necessary, the year after that. 
All payments would be made on the understanding that, in two irrigation 
seasons’ time – in July 2010 – the new future-proofed water-allocation 
regime would begin. 
If it remains dry over the next few years, considerable structural 
adjustment may be needed. Some irrigators will choose to leave the 
irrigation industry, others will choose to buy additional entitlement shares. 
Many will choose to invest the money in the development of more efficient 
systems. 
If the money received is reinvested, it should not be subject to capital 
gains tax. 
During this adjustment period, it will be critical that all impediments in the 
water market are removed. 
In order to encourage structural adjustment and rationalisation of supply 
systems, at least until 2011, all government water-trading charges should 
be waived. 
As part of the process of fixing water, it will be necessary to communicate 
carefully with all those living in rural communities about the nature and 
extent of the change that could be expected. 
Fixing water is also about fixing the communities who have found so many 
of the past attempts to manage water unsatisfactory. It needs to be 
stressed that the vision is to put in place, once and for all, a system that 
can be expected to work no matter what climatic conditions the future 
brings. 
How fast the step change is then implemented needs careful 
consideration. Rather than a complete step change, there is an option to 
phase in the proportion of shared water assigned to the environment over 
several years. A variant on this option would be to begin by allocating a 
smaller proportion to the environment and then using a voluntary share 
buy-back process to secure the remainder in a timely manner. It is also 
possible to buy water for the environment before the proposed step 
change to a new regime is implemented. 
If the money is transferred at least two years in advance of the step 
change, all irrigators would have sufficient time to consider how best to 
adapt. In our view, therefore, provided that adequate financial recompense 
and sufficient warning of the change is given, a complete step change that 
involves all irrigators is preferable to the uncertainty of a long drawn out 
adjustment process. 
Implementation of this proposed step change would need to be 
coordinated with existing regional assistance and structural adjustment 
programs. Existing commitments to purchase environmental water should 
still be honoured. 
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* 
Improve water trading processes 
It is also time to put in place inter-state water trading arrangements that 
are as efficient as those found anywhere in the world. In practice, there are 
two water markets: a market where entitlements, like company shares, are 
traded, and a market where seasonal allocations, which are more like 
dividends, are traded. 
One of the biggest impediments to improvement in the way water is 
managed is the presence of a significant number of extremely inefficient 
administrative practices. Under the current regime, it is possible for an 
interstate entitlement trade to take months. Under the new regime, it 
should be possible for entitlement trades to be executed as quickly as 
company shares can be traded on the stock market. It should also be 
possible for allocation trades to be executed in the same way that money 
can be moved from one bank account to another. The system therefore 
needs to: 
• Establish trading rules and processes that enable electronic 
trading across state boundaries so that: 
− all allocation trades can be completed 
instantaneously, and 
− all unencumbered entitlement trades can be 
completed within two days. 
* 
Allow water allocations to be carried forward 
In the northern Darling System, a significant water reform has been the 
conversion of a number of the existing entitlement regimes into ones that 
allow irrigators to decide whether or not to leave water in storage, use it or 
sell it. When water is left in storage, the amount stored is adjusted for 
evaporation. As a result, supply risk is managed largely by individual water 
users and governments do not have to decide between how much water to 
save and how much water to allocate each year. 
In a climate where both long-dry and long-wet periods can occur, every 
user is better off with an opportunity to decide how much water to use and 
how much to keep in storage. The next core element to be included in a 
new Murray-Darling Agreement is therefore to: 
• Allow all entitlement holders – all irrigators and all 
environmental managers – to carry forward allocations with 
adjustment for evaporative losses and seepage. 
In order to prevent flood damage, water users would need to understand 
that the system manager may decide to spill stored water when a storage 
is more than, say, 85 per cent full. When spilt, such water would be 
redefined as floodwater and managed by the Authority as it flowed through 
the system. 
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In some parts of the system, because of limitations on the capacity to 
deliver water for use, separate delivery entitlements will need to be 
assigned to water access entitlement holders. These delivery entitlements 




Review system size and configuration 
Exceptional rains may get the southern River Murray System out of trouble 
but, by the end of this irrigation season, it is still possible that River Murray 
System dams will be nearly empty and that well over forty wetlands and 
lakes will have been dried out. At the time of writing, the water level in 
Lake Albert and Lake Alexandrina is predicted to be more than half a 
metre below sea level. 
Recent rain is helping, but the amount of water necessary to fill this 
system back up to ‘empty’ is more than has flowed into the southern River 
Murray System during the past year. Several years of above-average 
rainfall are needed. If significant amounts of rainfall are not received by the 
end of August 2008, it would be wise to: 
• Commission a formal review of opportunities to downsize 
and reconfigure the southern River Murray System. 
It may not be possible to keep all environmental assets and all irrigation 
areas going. Parts of the system may have to be abandoned, and we may 
have to accept that parts may have changed forever. 
Another important reason for commissioning a formal review of 
opportunities to downsize and reconfigure the southern River Murray 
System is the prospect that we may be experiencing a shift to a drier 
regime. 
In Mediterranean climates, a 1 per cent decline in mean rainfall typically 
produces a 3 per cent decline in the amount of water that flows into the 
system. Australia appears to be getting drier. In Perth for instance, since 
1974, the amount of water in storage has never reached the average 
amount that was available before that year. Very small reductions in mean 
rainfall can result in very large reductions in the amount of water available 
to consumers. 
Because the amount of water lost to evaporation is a function of the size of 
the system, if existing environmental commitments are honoured, this 
means that a 10% reduction in mean rainfall can result in a 67% reduction 
in the amount of water available for use by irrigators (Table 1). If such a 
climate shift occurs, as it has in Western Australia, then this is another 
reason for immediately beginning a search for ways to reconfigure and 
downsize the current system. 
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Table 1 An illustrative overview of the consequences of a shift to a drier regime 
for a 10,000 GL system similar to the River Murray’s. (Readers are 
encouraged to enter their own assessment of how best to configure such a 
system if, as Perth has experienced, there is a 20% decline in mean rainfall). 
 
Mean rainfall shift  10% reduction in 
mean rainfall 
20% reduction 
in mean rainfall 
Mean inflow  10,000 7,000 4,000 
Mean evaporation 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Mean flow to the sea 2,000 2,000 ….. 
Net volume available for 
discretionary use 6,000 3,000 ….. 
Environmental entitlement 1,500 1,500 ….. 
Consumptive user entitlement 4,500 1,500 ….. 
Unallocated water 0 0 0 
Reduction in mean volume 
available to consumptive users  67% ….% 
* Murray-Darling Basin historical records indicate that mean annual inflows into the southern River 
Murray system including the Lower Darling is 11,229 GL per annum and the median inflow is 9,033 
GL per annum. 
* 
State incentive payments 
Payments to state and territory governments should be made conditional 
upon completion of already agreed National Water Initiative milestones, for 
both urban and rural agendas. This arrangement could extend to include 
funding for projects promised by the Rudd Government and also those that 
the previous government undertook to fund. It is time to: 
• Reward states for implementing reforms and for the delivery 
of agreed water reform milestones under an outcome-
focused regime similar to that set up under the National 
Competition Policy. 
It is time to bring some economic discipline back to water reform. 
* 
A new agreement – A future-proofed Basin 
It is time to reset the system now. The biggest mistake this nation could 
make is to take 10 years to only partially fix the Murray-Darling Basin’s 
problems. 
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A new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement is needed. This new Agreement 
must be more than a general plan. It must be a co-operative inter-state 
Agreement that rises above politics, and it must not be subject to the 
whims of ministers or other authorities. It is time to stop incremental 
approaches to water reform and return to a focus on getting the 
fundamentals right. 
Now is the time to confidently inform those who depend upon, and love the 
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Summary of key elements of the proposal 
A 3-part 
system 
1. Set aside enough maintenance water to allow for evaporative 
and other losses, existing stock and domestic uses10 and to 





2. Leave floodwater, when it arrives, to be managed in a way that 
maximises environmental benefit whilst minimising damage to 
property. 
 3. Define the remaining water as shared water and put in place a 
regime that entitles all users and the environment to a share of 
any allocations made to this pool of water. 
Ground and 
surface water 
4. Define all groundwater as part of the system and use a similar 
sharing system to allocate entitlements to take water from it. 
Offset all 
interception 
5. Require the offset of the adverse effects on supply reliability of 
all water interception activities such as forestry in high rainfall 
areas, the building of more farm dams and the construction of 
salinity interception schemes. 
A right for the 
environment 
6. In every part of the system, the environment must be given a 





7. The majority of shared water entitlements assigned to the 
environment should be placed in regional environmental trusts 
and a small proportion held centrally in a system wide trust. 
Appoint 
trustees 
8. Assign responsibility for appointing environmental trustees and 
defining regional trusts’ objectives to the States and the ACT. 
Environment 
pays its way 
9. The amount of shared water entitlement allocated to 
environment trusts should be large enough to enable them to 
recover costs by periodically selling water allocations. 
Bulk 
entitlements 
10. Replace the existing cap and limit on water extractions and 
associated sharing rules with a bulk entitlement system that is 




11. The establishment of a Basin water entitlement register that 
defines bulk entitlements to receive allocations, and assignment 
of complete responsibility for allocating water to an independent, 
expertise-based Authority. 
Penalties that 
apply to all 
12. The introduction and enforcement of penalties for taking 
unallocated water. These must apply equally to states, irrigation 
companies, entities responsible for managing environmental 
water and all other parties. 
                                            
10
  The emphasis here is on existing stock and domestic uses which in most cases 





13. Establish an independent, expertise-based Authority responsible 
for allocating groundwater and surface water, informed by the 
best available science. 
Equal 
opportunity  
14. Give all stakeholders an equal opportunity to access information 




15. Responsibility for the control of land-use and water-use 
practices should remain with the States and the ACT on the 
understanding that they deliver agreed salinity and other water-
quality management targets, and manage offset arrangements 
for the adverse effects of water interception activities. 
Leave water 
supply as it is 
16. Use business structures to run and maintain system 




17. Compensate entitlement holders and water supply companies 
for the impact of the change on their livelihoods and on the value 




18. Establish trading rules and processes that enable electronic 
trading across state boundaries so that: 
- all allocation trades can be completed instantaneously, and 
- all unencumbered entitlement trades can be completed  
 within two days. 
Carry forward 19. Allow all entitlement holders – all irrigators and all environmental 





20. Commission a formal review of opportunities to downsize and 
reconfigure the southern River Murray System. 
Reward States 21. Reward states for implementing reforms and for the delivery of 
agreed water reform milestones under an outcome-focused 
regime similar to that set up under the National Competition 
Policy. 
 
